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I July I994 to 30 June I995
Reviews of American Samoa, Hawai'i,
Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna, and West-
ern Samoa are not included in this
issue.
THE COOK ISLANDS
"Wealth, health, and happiness with-
out cost or effort" might be the slogan
of the year under review. The oppor-
tunistic "quick fix" epitomized
approaches to problems of personal
and government finance, of body
and soul. The advertisements that
flood television screens with messages
of instant gratification have become
the basis of public policy and private
practice, beginning with the national
purse.
The truth was particularly elusive
this year. Gossip about huge and shady
international deals was officially dis-
missed until in January 1995 the Cook
Islands Press revealed that the govern-
ment had issued Letters of Guarantee
for US$I.1 billion, equivalent to all
government income for the next
twenty-one years at present levels. The
New Zealand Government feared it
might be obligated through its associ-
ated state relationship with the Cook
Islands, and the fact that the Cook
Islands dollar was tied to the New
Zealand dollar. Eventually the Cook
Islands Government agreed to an
investigation by Jerse Halliday of the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The
Cook Islands prime minister told an
anxious public that Halliday's report
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proved no risks had been taken and
all was well. He would not release
the report, but the New Zealand
minister of Foreign Affairs did. It
described the Cook Islands Gov-
ernment as a gullible victim of an
attempted fraud perpetrated by others.
The author did not think Sir Geoffrey
Henry or other government officials
had acted for personal gain, though
they naively hoped the deal would
yield us$26 million in commissions
for the nation.
Government assurances that the
Letters of Guarantee were risk-free and
with reputable financiers were false. A
Television New Zealand documentary
showed that the key players included a
bankrupt Irish fraudster with a prose-
cution for tax evasion, another man
claiming to represent a company that
Television New Zealand found had
been deregistered since 1978, an Amer-
ican living in luxury in the Bahamas
and wanted for questioning in the
United States, and a former plumber
who financed various things including
pornographic video.
James Byrne, an American expert
on international bank fraud, told Tele-
vision New Zealand he did not expect
any benefit would reach the Cook
Islands from such transactions even if
carried through (TVNZ Assignment,
25 May 1995). Tony Molloy, QC,
noted that the Cook Islands Govern-
ment had "demonstrated in other
spheres recently that it has a vulnera-
bility to advice that appears to be pres-
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tigious, and perhaps it is just fairly
easily sucked in. They're terribly
impressed with all the jet-setting para-
phernalia that goes with these things"
(CIP, 2S May I99S). The head of the
New Zealand Serious Fraud Office,
who investigated the New Zealand
intermediary, stated that at least some
of the people the government dealt
with were known fraudsters, and that
the Letters of Guarantee were intended
for illegitimate use in "prime bank
instrument fraud" (CIN, 3 June I99S).
The Cook Islands Government tried to
"protect" itself with a secret "blocked
funds letter," whereby it would not
honor the guarantees. The Serious
Fraud Office report spoke of the
"Alice in Wonderland quality" of
"giving the appearance, but not the
reality, of financial substance."
The Letters of Guarantee have been
canceled. Nothing was gained, though
how much the government lost in
travel, fees, and other expenses is not
known. It gave "insufficient attention
to the risks ... to the international rep-
utation of the Cook Islands" and did
not heed warnings in its own files
about the criminal reputation of those
involved. Fortunately, despite pressure
from "the instigators of the scam, the
safety nets held-but only just."
Otherwise the nation could have lost
its assets and incurred vast debt.
The "Wine Box Affair" was another
running media event. It began in Octo-
ber I992 when the New Zealand Seri-
ous Fraud Office received a wine-box
full of evidence of massive tax dodges
by New Zealand companies and indi-
viduals. The commissioner of Inland
Revenue castigated the ethics of those
who designed the scheme, which he
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said showed massive and blatant tax
avoidance, while a prominent criminal
lawyer, Peter Williams, described it as
the "biggest tax evasion scam" in New
Zealand's history. Most used European
Pacific, the largest "trustee company"
(the polite term for tax-haven banks)
in the Cook Islands. Although some of
New Zealand's leading financiers and
financial institutions were implicated,
the New Zealand Government was
reluctant to act. The leading names
were big donors to the governing
party's election funds. But pressure
inside and outside Parliament led to a
judicial enquiry, which gets prime-time
television coverage in New Zealand
and much of the Pacific. That drama
continues.
The Cook Islands Government
promised to set up its own enquiry but
is not expected to unless it can protect
those to whom it is obligated. The
architect of the tax haven, Mr David
Lloyd, gave $6 million in I993 to pay
for the national cultural center, which
the government rated as its top priority
project. Mr Trevor Clarke, former
national head of European Pacific
Bank, is now Prime Minister Sir Geof-
frey Henry's financial adviser.
Winston Peters, the New Zealand
politician who led the pressure for the
enquiry, might have been discredited as
"racist" or "colonialist" for criticizing
the Cook Islands, were he not Maori
and Minister for Maori Affairs after
that department was caught in interna-
tionalloan scams. He has no sympathy
for a government that gets most of its
foreign aid from New Zealand taxpay-
ers (Nz$I4 million a year for 20,000
people), while creating schemes to
defraud them of hundreds of millions.
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Mr Peters says the infamous Bank of
Credit and Commerce International,
which dealt in "political bribes, laun-
dering money, guns, nuclear weapons
and with figures such as Noriega and
Marcos," and whose top executive was
jailed for eleven years for massive
fraud, was involved in the Cook
Islands "international finance center."
Cook Islands Government claims that
the tax haven is "squeaky clean" are
no longer heard. Mr Peters' advocacy
of canceling New Zealand aid to the
Cook Islands is gaining support there,
as many New Zealand taxpayers feel
"ripped off" by the Cook Islands tax
haven. Aid will not be canceled,
although sympathy for special conces-
sions to the Cook Islands has been
eroded. While this year New Zealand
maintained previous levels of aid to
other South Pacific countries, and
increased funds for East Asia, it
trimmed aid to the Cooks by 5 percent.
Growth in gross domestic product
in the Cook Islands was high through-
out the 1980s (6 to 10 percent per
year) but only 1.7 percent in 1993 and
1.5 percent in 1994. In 1994-.95 it is
likely to be negative. The main cause
was poor economic policy and poorer
economic practice. The engines of the
economy have worked well-tourism
(the biggest industry) grew during the
past decade faster than anywhere else
in the Pacific. The second industry,
marine resources, is booming on the
basis of pearls and tuna. Fresh fish
prices are high and demand exceeds
supply. Agricultural products sell well
to hotels, the local market, and for air-
freight to New Zealand and the United
States-with producers unable to ful-
fill orders.
However, in recent years, unpredict-
able implementation of stated policies,
dense regulatory processes, lack of
confidence in the currency, and adverse
international publicity seem to have
deterred investors of integrity and
attracted those lacking it. The new
ostrich-farming industry and pro-
posed investments in tourism and
other fields were put on hold. Reasons
for the 1995 decline in tourism, the
largest single industry, included "nega-
tive publicity with respect to the econ-
omy, currency, and the dengue
epidemic" according to the director
of tourism (elF, 25 May 1995).
Meanwhile, government enterprises
have not done well. There was no
progress during the year on the most
expensive construction project ever
undertaken in the country-another
government-owned hotel. Five years
after construction began with Italian
finance and builders, it remains an
empty shell. The most recent official
estimate of its value is understood to
be one quarter of the cost to the gov-
ernment so far. The head of the com-
pany that initiated the project has been
indicted in Italy for Mafia activities.
Several years ago the government
bought the long-abandoned St Helen's
Hospital in Wellington, New Zealand.
This year it sold it at a heavy loss in
real terms. The government pearl-
culture farm in Manihiki is a financial
disaster, despite heavy subsidies, while
private operators pay their own costs
and make profits. The government
pearl venture in Suwarrow was aban-
doned after heavy expenditure and no
income.
Government revenues should be
buoyant, for taxes are very high rela-
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tive to services provided. There is a 10
percent value added tax on all transac-
tions, plus income tax of 37 percent at
$35,000 (about US$2I,000), as well as
many other government charges. One
problem is inefficient collection. Over-
due taxes increased from CI$7.3 mil-
lion (27 percent) in 1992 to $9.3
million (36 percent) in 1993, some of it
due from government-owned commer-
cial enterprises. No later figures are
available.
Government borrowing has been
the popular solution to these economic
problems, but after certain limits were
reached, "regular" financiers were
reluctant to help. When overdrafts
from commercial banks reached
NZ$4.5 million, and the banks refused
to lend more, the government found a
temporary solution in credit from sup-
pliers. The firms have not been repaid,
and the government is months (even
years) behind in paying for goods and
services. Some firms have had to
shorten work hours, layoff staff, or
close.
There were also plans to stimulate
the economy through loan-financed
projects, and two confidential "wish
lists" of projects were drawn up. The
projects to be funded were mainly non-
productive, the main one on the A List
being a new government building
(including some premises for rent), and
on the B List, a new parliament build-
ing. Some cI$64 million (US$43 mil-
lion) in funding for A List projects was
to be raised from La Deuce Credit and .
Finance Limited in Houston, Texas,
through a Samoan intermediary. With
interest, A List funding would have
lifted government debt from almost nil
in I987 to CI$246 million in I994, to
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$338 million in mid-I995. B List fund-
ing would have boosted government
debt to CI$400 million.
The main cause of government
overexpenditure is a public service of
excessive size and generally low effi-
ciency (despite some remarkable
exceptions). Public announcements
about a freeze on hiring for the past
two years contrast with the reality of
more government employees than ever
before. Rather than retrench the many
who do very little, and constrain frivo-
lous expenditure, the government in
May 1995 raised the tax on diesel by
83 percent, petrol by 55 percent, and
cigarettes by 45 percent, with similar
raises on some other commodities.
While announced reductions in the
public service remained largely unim-
plemented, government-financed
workers on wages did have their hours
reduced by one per day, and those on
salaries offered to accept NZ$ 500 less
pay over the next six months to avoid
larger proposed cuts.
The critical limelight was attracted
by such spectacular expenditures as
chartering a plane to take a team of
dancers, politicians, and officials to
welcome the arrival in Tahiti of two
traditional voyaging canoes from the
Cook Islands that were joining a trip
to the Marquesas and Hawai'i. Despite
an outcry about that, another team
went at public expense to welcome
them again in the Marquesas, and yet
another to receive them in Hawai'i. It
was hoped there would be canoes from
all of Polynesia, but the only others
were three from Hawai'i (with US
federal funds) and one from New
Zealand, neither of which brought in
dance teams or politicians. This accen-
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tuated the CI$668,282 spent by the
government this year on the canoes.
Former Prime Minister Sir Tom Davis
designed and supervised both vessels
and commanded the larger one to
Hawai'i. There was public support for
the project, but not for the scale of
expenditure on "hangers-on" at a time
of extreme shortage of funds for medi-
cines in hospitals, books in schools,
and to reconnect telephones discon-
nected from government departments
because of nonpayment.
Another indication of spending
beyond need was apparent in Decem-
ber 1994 when seven of nine govern-
ment ministers traveled internationally.
Ministers take their wives at govern-
ment expense on one trip annually-
usually the most expensive. Govern-
ment expenditure on travel for minis-
ters and officials probably absorbs a
larger share of national income than
for all but a few countries in the world.
Budget details in June 1995 showed
that while most other items had been
cut, travel by members of parliament
had increased by 34 percent.
A full high commission (embassy)
was set up in Canberra, where a part-
time nondiplomatic representative
formerly met the need. There was
debate about whether the costs were
merited relative to the benefits.
Although less important than other
overseas posts, running costs are much
more, about $420,000 a year plus
such capital costs as a $498,000 house
for the high commissioner. Until his
appointment he was an influential
politician who, severely criticized by
the chief justice for misuse of power,
was considered unable to win his seat
again.
The government released an
increasing volume of unbacked cur-
rency, which lost its value and integ-
rity. Exporters to the Cook Islands
insisted on tradeable currency, and the
banks imposed exchange controls on
nontrade transactions. As a result, the
government abandoned Cook Islands
currency in May 1995 and reverted to
New Zealand currency. The arrange-
ment is common in the Pacific-Kiri-
bati, Nauru, and Tuvalu all use only
Australian currency; the Marshall
Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia both use only US currency.
Nevertheless, it was a symbolic blow
because Cook Islands national cur-
rency was an emblem of sovereignty
and identity, even though its value was
tied at par to the New Zealand dollar.
Meanwhile in the wider society,
there has been a parallel move to
"quick fix" religions, and away from
the now conventional Catholic and
Protestant churches. Denominations
that promise more, better, faster, and
longer-lasting results on earth and in
heaven, are fruitful and multiply. They
are US-derived, fundamentalist, evan-
gelical, and pentecostal-particularly
the Apostolic and the Assemblies of
God. For a while, these became the
middle of a moving road, as the New
Kingdom was born, founded by a
woman who claimed to be Jesus
Christ. While fundamentalists concen-
trate on sorting out the soul, the New
Kingdom promises to fix body and
soul at one fell swoop. Her compound
was frequented by the head of state,
some members of cabinet, some minis-
ters of other churches, a Catholic nun,
and hundreds of others. The Master
(as the spirit in her body was known)
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occupied government quarters rent-
free and received unofficial conces-
sions from the government.
When the woman's body did not
take on all the attributes of a man, as
the prophecy required, numbers
waned, and a new revelation explained
that the Devil persisted in deceiving the
people. Jesus needed support, so the
body became known as the Tokorima
(The Five), and was occupied by Jesus,
the Virgin Mary, God the Father, God
the Holy Ghost, and Joseph. Yet the
membership kept falling. A new
prophecy was needed. It was that the
government would change. The new
prime minister would be Norman
George, who mentioned the Tokorima
in respectful tones in his election
addresses. Alas, Mr George's party
gained only two seats out of twenty-
five. The following dwindled to an
incorruptible core. The Tokorima and
the faithful few were evicted from gov-
ernment buildings in December 1994
and the New Kingdom headquarters
shifted to the island of Aitutaki. A few
weeks later the Tokorima departed for
Tahiti.
While Christian fundamentalists
look back to a selective interpretation
of the story of Jesus, cultural funda-
mentalists see solutions to today's
problems in the "Tangaroa Cult" a
"return" to a sanitized version of
ancient beliefs, values, and life-ways as
epitomized by the great god Tangaroa.
1here is both conflict and congruence
between Christian and traditional fun-
damentalists. Some leading individu-
als expound both (but don't practice
much of either). Both are protective
reactions against external global
forces, as well as a convenient cover
against allegations of being guided by
foreign models of consumption, behav-
ior, and values, or manipulated by for-
eign fraudsters.
This year's crop of transient "cul-
ture based" medicinal remedies
included magic mushrooms and a
potion made from coconut husks.
Equally transient "cultural solutions"
to social, psychological, and political
problems abound. A plethora of short-
cuts to personal financial prosperity
follows a similar pattern, with an
amazing range of fund-raising tech-
niques, from raffles to lotteries, road-
side collections, telethons, soliciting,
and many more by "small fry," and
massive theft, fraud, and misrepresen-
tation by large operators.
Although it did not become public,
the government tried to negotiate with
New Zealand for a further "evolution"
in the associated state relationship.
The reason given was economic, that
some aid donors will not give to the
Cook Islands under its present status.
This has not concerned most donors. It
constrained European aid through the
Lome Convention to Africa, the Carib-
bean, and the Pacific, but only because
the African bloc objected.
The goals of this year's negotiations
with New Zealand were three, in the
following order of priority: First,
membership of the Commonwealth;
second, formalization of Cook Islands
citizenship and passports; and third,
separate diplomatic accreditation.
Although all 51 Commonwealth
nations are nominally equal, a country
like India with 900 million people may
not regard a country with 20,000
people as really equal, although Tuvalu
and Kiribati are full members. Some
I80 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING I99 6
countries object to Cook Islands
membership lest the associated state
relationship compromise its indepen-
dence. The Cook Islands wanted to
join in time for Sir Geoffrey Henry to
attend the I995 Commonwealth Prime
Ministers Conference, a hope not
likely to be realized.
Some Commonwealth countries
may object to Cook Islands member-
ship without modifications to its con-
stitution (see next two items). The
same may still apply to the Lome Con-
vention, but probably not to the
United Nations, membership of which
the Cook Islands is now considering.
Countries with much less "indepen-
dence" than the Cook Islands are full
members of the United Nations (eg,
Monaco, San Marino, Andorra,
Liechtenstein) so the key question is
likely to be cost rather than constitu-
tional status.
As a formality, Cook Islanders
travel on New Zealand passports,
although separate citizenship is firmly
in place, created through a Cook
Islands Immigration and Departure
Act rather than a citizenship act in
order to obfuscate the reality of dual
citizenship. Any Cook Islander can
enter New Zealand at any time with-
out restriction and has full rights to
vote, work, draw social security bene-
fits, and so forth. However, no New
Zealander has comparable rights in the
Cook Islands, which has not granted
permanent residence to any person
since 1989, despite many requests.
During that time thousands of Cook
Islanders moved freely to New
Zealand and Australia.
Separate passports would allow
restrictions on the entry and rights of
persons of Cook Islands descent who
live elsewhere (and that is most of
them). It would also allow the sale of
passports to rich stateless foreigners
from such places as Hong Kong and
Taiwan-as is done by Tonga and the
Marshall Islands.
The New Zealand position has long
been that if Cook Islanders want to
sever the associated state relationship,
they will agree immediately. However,
the Cook Islands Government did
not tell the people of the negotiation
because they know that the public
opposes severing a tie from which
they gain so much. Also, as New
Zealanders, they have free access and
full privileges in Australia as well.
Some 4°,000 Cook Islanders live in
New Zealand and about 10,000 in
Australia. Only 28 percent choose to
stay at home. There are limits to how
much cake New Zealand will allow the
Cook Islands Government to eat and
keep at the same time.
New Zealand and Australia deal
with the Cook Islands diplomatically
as they do with all Commonwealth
countries, by accrediting a high com-
missioner to each other's capital. How-
ever, some countries-notably Japan-
do not treat the Cook Islands as fully
independent. This is a question of status
more than material gain, for Japan
gives foreign aid to the Cook Islands.
One of New Zealand's concerns in
granting further privileges to the Cook
Islands while Cook Islanders retain
New Zealand citizenship and rights,
was the doubtful financial transactions
for which the Cook Islands is getting
an undesirable reputation and for
which New Zealand is at times criti-
cized.
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In national politics, complaints
about the government were louder this
year than ever since 1977-78. Loss of
jobs and income, as well as media
exposure of what had been suppressed,
increased awareness and concern. Usu-
ally in a parliamentary democracy such
as the Cook Islands that leads to calls
for the opposition to take over, but the
opposition remains weak and divided,
and few regard it as a credible alterna-
tive government.
The government blames the media
for the negative episodes, but the
media here are more restrained than in
most countries. Television and radio
news comes only through government-
owned stations, the main owners of
the daily newspaper are expatriates on
work permits that the government can
cancel, and the weekly Cook Islands
Press was set up by a European perma-
nent resident. Equivalent government
actions in most OEeD countries would
attract more aggressive media atten-
tion.
One defense against attacks from
media and political opponents was the
prime minister's assertion in Parlia-
ment (where he is protected from defa-
mation suits) that the Cook Islands
Press and TVNZ were financed by the
t::IA to spread propaganda as part of a
US plot to overthrow his government.
Ihe prime minister knows that most
voters probably sympathized with the
i.mage of him and them being under
attack from evil foreign sources.
With the year going badly for the
government, and with deepening dis-
unity and despair, the divided country
needed a common external enemy at
whom hostility could be redirected.
Salvation came when President Chirac
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announced that France would resume
nuclear testing. In view of the Cook
Islands' continuing debts to France for
power, water, and other projects, and
hope for more, the prime minister sent
a token protest but said there would be
no public protest or boycott of the
coming South Pacific Games in Tahiti.
In this he misjudged the public pulse.
Norman George, leader of the
opposition Alliance Party, organized a
protest. As minister of foreign affairs
he had been wined and dined at Moru-
roa as an honored guest of the French
government and was very subdued
about bombs-but now that he is in
opposition this was a heaven-sent
opportunity. The public reaction was
overwhelming, with radio talk-backs,
letters to the newspaper, and gossip all
galvanized against France. The prime
minister astutely shifted tack, making
an impassioned plea for public support
for a protest march, which he led in
triumph, eclipsing Mr George. He
urged public servants to join, promis-
ing them full pay, and pleaded with
church leaders, businesses, chiefs,
sports groups, youth groups, women's
groups, tourists, and all to join in with
their people. It was the biggest and
most unified demonstration the nation
has ever seen.
The entry of women into local poli-
tics was the highlight of the 1995 elec-
tions for island councilors. Previously,
the mayor was elected by and from the
island councilors. Under a new law the
mayor is elected by the public from
outside the council, and becomes ex
officio chair of the council. At the last
election, in 1992, the only woman
candidate (for the island of Manihiki)
was not elected. In 1995, partly due
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errors have been made, and that qual-
ity, integrity, skill, efficiency, and com-
mitment pay better in the long run
than the slick pseudo-solutions that
characterized all but the end of this
year.
SEVERAL knowledgeable and helpful
persons kindly commented on the draft






The period under review was typical of
political life in Tahiti. It was marked
by sporadic conflict between state and
territorial authorities, splits and defec-
tions within and between political
parties, two electoral campaigns, and
industrial disputes too numerous to
mention. Once again, the shadow of
the nuclear testing center loomed large
following President Chirac's announce-
ment of a resumption of testing.
Tensions between the territory and
the state emerged in late 1994. The
biggest rift occurred over the state-run
to the official who organized the
elections emphasizing women's right
to stand, partly to a local television
program encouraging them to stand,
and partly to indirect pressures for
more equality for women, three
women stood for mayoral posts and
two as island councilors. None suc-
ceeded, although one nearly became
mayor of Aitutaki.
Letters of Guarantee, "shonky"
loans, the return of Jesus, and embez-
zlement have not yet solved all the
problems of the Cook Islands, but
believers in any of these and other rem-
edies feel they are worth a try, and note
that things might have been worse
without them. While some await the
next "quick fix," the solid economic
growth was provided by those who
devoted skill and effort to the task-
the producers of fish, pearls, farm
produce, tourist facilities, small but
profitable innovations like maire fern
(which supplies the Hawai'i market),
local cosmetics and perfumes, hand-
made pottery, and other proven
income generators. Many local enter-
prises do well for themselves and
for the community. Following the
announced change of government
practices, tourism was picking up
again, the ostrich industry resumed on
Mangaia, and an alpaca industry is
being considered. The Cook Islands
may also be the world's first nation to
evolve commercially viable and envi-
ronmentally sound exploitation of
seabed minerals, if Bechtel Corpora-
tion's assessments, planned for 1995,
confirm expected prospects.
The leaders in government now
acknowledge-verbally so far, and
hopefully in practice before long-that
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Administrative Tribunal's decision to
annul the Territorial Solidarity Contri-
bution tax on 29 July. The territory's
first income tax ever, this had been
approved by the Territorial Assembly
and 2 billion French Pacific francs
(FCFP) had already been collected.
When the tax was annulled by French
judges because it was unconstitutional,
reimbursing taxpayers and forgoing
anticipated revenue created major dif-
ficulties for the territorial budget. It
also raised questions about the govern-
ment's ability to provide universal
social welfare, which was to be funded
by the tax. The Territorial Assembly
has attempted to make the tax law
compatible with the constitution, but
without success. As in the past, the
state's ability, and preparedness, to
revoke laws duly passed by the
assembly led to calls for reform to
the Statute of Internal Autonomy.
With regard to party politics, the
troubles plaguing the Here Ai'a party
continued. Jean Juventin had allied the
party to Gaston Flosse's government
majority in September 1991, but con-
flict between the two leaders finally
came to a head in August 1994. Juven-
tin deserted the majority and led an
attempt by the opposition to topple the
government via a motion of censure.
Two other Here Ai'a members, Maco
Tevane and Tony Hiro, gave up their
ministries to participate in the rebellion.
They obtained only 18 signatures for
the motion, whereas 21 were needed
for the political coup to succeed.
In a fit of pique over the failed take-
over bid, Juventin adopted a disruptive
strategy. In his capacity as president
(speaker) of the Territorial Assembly,
he refused to convene it for several
months. (The same tactic was
employed by Emile Vernaudon in
1992, after he had fallen out of favor
with Flosse's governing coalition.)
Meanwhile, a mutiny erupted in the
ranks of Here Ai'a as the beleaguered
Juventin refused to relinquish the lead-
ership. Two of Here Ai'a's leading
lights, Tinomana "Milou" Ebb and
Raymond Van Bastolaer, left in Octo-
ber and created a new party of their
own called Te Avei'a Mau.
According to Ebb, a principal goal
of Te Avei'a Mau is to campaign for
a political status of independence in
association with France similar to the
Cook Islands' arrangement with New
Zealand. President Flosse attended the
launch of Te Avei'a Mau. The new
party is closely aligned with Flosse's
Tahoeraa party and benefits from this
patronage. Van Bastolaer is still a gov-
ernment minister, while Ebb replaced
Juventin as president of the Territorial
Assembly in April.
The parliamentary opposition was
thrown into disarray in February when
Emile Vernaudon's Ai'a Api party once
again affiliated with the ruling major-
ity of Tahoeraa. This switch in alle-
giance seems surprising, as the
personal enmity between Vernaudon
and Flosse runs very deep and their
previous coalitions in 1982 and 1991
lasted only a few months. But the
mayor of Mahina is a master of prag-
matism. Moreover, his relations with
allies in the opposition had become
increasingly tense since the failed
attempt to oust Tahoeraa from the
government. In return for Vernaudon's
newfound loyalty to the government,
his director of cabinet, Patrick Bordet,
was made a minister in April.
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As in 1993-94, the French courts
were busy prosecuting Tahitian politi-
cians for abuse of office. Juventin's
fortunes plummeted to a new low with
his conviction for corruption in deal-
ings with the Tamara'a Nui rubbish
disposal company. He received a six-
month suspended sentence and a 1.8
million FCFP fine. Juventin and his
counterpart, Maco Tevane, were also
being investigated for corruption in
relation to Pape'ete town hall's funding
of the Pare Nui cultural association.
Napoleon Spitz, a mayor and territo-
rial councillor, was convicted of elec-
toral fraud. He was one of the longest
serving and wiliest politicians in the
territory, and a major promoter of
sport. In late May, Spitz died of natu-
ral causes.
Former President Alexandre Leon-
tieff experienced the ignoming of
spending a few months in a Parisian
jail while he awaited the results of a
corruption trial. He was detained and
imprisoned because he had repeatedly
breached the probation condition that
he was not to meet with Juventin.
Leontieff and Juventin were both
accused of receiving kickbacks from a
Japanese investor in connection with
the proposed Opunohu golf course
development at Moorea. Flosse was
more fortunate in the courts. After two
years of appeals, he finally succeeded
in having a corruption conviction over
his Erima land acquisitions over-
turned.
The two rounds of the French presi-
dential elections were held on 23 April
and 7 May. Local politicians cam-
paigned earnestly on behalf of their
preferred candidates. The outcome
provided some indication of the influ-
ence enjoyed by territorial parties. Pre-
dictably, Flosse campaigned in favor of
his long-standing friend and colleague
in the RassembLement pour La Repub-
Lique, Jacques Chirac. Personal loyal-
ties aside, Flosse expected the territory
to receive preferential treatment if
Chirac were president and had
obtained guarantees to this effect.
Whereas the Balladur government had
failed to forward funds committed
under the Development Contract for
1994 and 1995, Chirac promised these
monies would be transferred promptly
to the territory under his presidency.
Moreover, Chirac agreed to consider
transferring control over French
Polynesia's exclusive economic zone to
the territory. Finally, Chirac gave an
assurance that the state would cover
the cost to the territory of reimbursing
the annulled income tax.
Juventin, the Leontieff brothers,
Senator Millaud, and Francis Sanford
all lent their support to then French
Prime Minister Edouard Balladur.
Jacqui Drollet's Ia Mana party was the
only one to back the socialist candi-
date, Lionel Jospin. Of the main presi-
dential aspirants, Jospin was the only
one tocategorically rule out a resump-
tion of French nuclear testing. Despite
their antinuclear policy, Oscar Temaru
and his party, Tavini, did not support
Jospin. Instead, they advocated absten-
tion. Since 1981, Tavini has boycotted
elections for the French presidency and
the European Parliament as a way of
signaling its desire for the territory to
be granted independence.
In the first round of the poll in
French Polynesia, Jospin received only
12.5 percent of the votes cast, Balladur
25 percent, while Chirac was a clear
favorite with 52 percent. In the second
round, when only two candidates
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remained, Jospin obtained 39 percent
while Chirac, with 61 percent of the
territorial vote, enjoyed a far more
comfortable win than he had in metro-
politan France. Strong support for
Chirac can be attributed to intense
campaigning by Flosse. Another
factor was that, because of the time
difference, Tahitians already knew
Chirac was the victor when they
went to the polls. Overall, participa-
tion was very poor, with only 50
percent of eligible voters casting a
ballot. To what extent this can be
ascribed to the pro-independence
boycott or to apathy and bad weather
is unclear.
Of far greater importance to
Polynesian voters are the municipal
elections, held every six years, in which
they have the opportunity to vote for
someone they know will lobby for
their interests. They also seek rewards
for their loyalty in the form of patron-
age dispensed by the successful candi-
date. Politicians view control over
municipal councils as essential to
launching an entry into territorial poli-
tics. In 199I, half the councilors
elected to the Territorial Assembly
were mayors.
Loyalty to individual leaders means
that mayors are virtually impossible
to dislodge in French Polynesia. The
municipal elections held in June 1995
followed the established pattern
whereby the overwhelming majority of
mayors retained office. Three-quarters
of incumbent mayors were returned
with an absolute majority in the first
round of voting. Gaston Flosse and
Oscar Temaru entrenched control
over their respective municipal power
bases in Pirae and Faa'a, with more
than two-thirds of the vote. Emile Ver-
185
naudon was also comfortably returned
in Mahina with 60 percent of the vote.
Boris Leontieff's popularity was con-
firmed with a landslide victory in
Arue.
The most hotly contested munici-
pality was the capital, Pape'ete. The
three candidates who reached the
second round were Jean Juventin,
Michel Buillard, and James Salmon.
After controlling Pape'ete town hall
for eighteen years either directly, or
indirectly via Louise Carlson since
1993, Juventin saw this prize fall to
Buillard. Juventin's loss was self-
inflicted. He had been implicated in at
least three cases of corruption, two of
which concerned misuse of municipal
funds. This may not have been enough
to destroy his reputation, but under his
leadership the Pape'ete council had
become bankrupt and suffered the
indignity of having its administration
taken over by the state. The new
mayor, Buillard, is vice-president of
both the Tahoeraa party and the cur-
rent government. His municipal list
included government ministers and
was supported in force by the Tahoe-
raa party machine. Buillard won with
over 50 percent of the vote against
Juventin's 32 percent.
In terms of party trends the munici-
pal elections reinforced Tahoeraa's
dominance. Overall, Tahoeraa
claimed 60 percent of the votes in these
elections. In addition to retaining
incumbent mayors, Tahoeraa made
new gains including Pape'ete and
Moorea. For the first time the pro-
independence party, Tavini, had the
wherewithal to field lists throughout
the territory. It improved on its 1989
performance, doubling its share of the
vote to roughly 17 percent of the total.
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Tavini's candidate in Pape'ete, Salmon,
came a poor third with 14 percent of
the vote, but Temaru was satisfied that
since the last elections their share of
the vote in the capital had increased
from 600 to 1360.
The most momentous development
of the year for French Polynesia was
President Chirac's announcement on
13 June of a final nuclear test series to
be held at Moruroa and Fangataufa.
Chirac had made numerous references
to the possibility of a test resumption,
but after three years of moratorium the
majority of Tahitians had come to sup-
port a permanent test ban. Neverthe-
less, either they were not fully aware of
Chirac's plans or antinuclear sentiment
was not strong enough to counter
other factors in favor of Chirac's can-
didacy, as he received a clear majority
in the presidential elections.
Opposition to a test resumption was
almost unanimous. In the view of terri-
torial politicians, the past advantages
of hosting the testing center were now
outweighed by numerous costs. The
state had already agreed to compensate
the territory for the economic loss
incurred by a closure of the test site
under a ten-year plan. The financial
gains involved in hosting a final series
of eight tests were not sufficient to
warrant supporting the decision on
economic grounds. In addition,
Chirac's decision aroused concern
about the impact on tourism and rela-
tions with South Pacific neighbors.
A specific focus for anxiety was the
potentially adverse effect of a test
resumption on attendance at the Tenth
South Pacific Games to be hosted by
Tahiti in August.
President Flosse, hitherto a sup-
porter of the testing center's presence,
expressed his opposition to a test
resumption only days before the deci-
sion was announced. He said it would
provoke territorial protests and oppo-
sition throughout the region. However,
he qualified his position in saying, "As
a Polynesian and President of the gov-
ernment I am not in favor of a test
resumption, but I am also French. If it
is in the interests of the nation and if
it is a decision of the President of the
Republic, we can only bow to that
decision." It was somewhat humiliat-
ing for Flosse when Chirac told him
not only to wear the test resumption
but to defend it against criticisms from
the region. Flosse complied by arguing
that the French nuclear deterrent
upheld the Gaullist tradition and con-
tributed to world peace. Furthermore,
tests were necessary to maintain the
credibility of the deterrent.
Flosse and Tahoeraa were alone in
their attempts to justify the test
resumption. All other leading politi-
cians and parties, numerous trade
unions, nongovernment organizations
such as Hiti Tau, environmentalists,
and churches came out against the
tests. Anti-testing activities reached a
climax on 29 June. This date coincided
with the eleventh anniversary of inter-
nal autonomy and the arrival of the
Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior II,
en route to Moruroa. Two week-long
marches from either side of the island
of Tahiti met up in the capital. Between
six-and-twelve thousand people partic-
ipated in the peaceful rally, making it
Tahiti's biggest ever antinuclear dem-
onstration. This contrasted with the
government's celebration of autonomy
in Pirae, which only four hundred
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invited guests attended. When local
authorities denied the Rainbow War-
rior the right to moor at the town cen-
ter, antinuclear protesters mounted
barricades at entrances to the capital,
blocking traffic access for three days.
Flosse's response to these develop-
ments has been that the best form of
defense is attack. He charged antinu-
clear protesters with deliberately using
the test issue to destabilize his govern-
ment and to promote the pro-indepen-
dence cause. In the face of virulent
antinuclear protests from Australia
and New Zealand, Flosse accused
those two countries of inciting Pacific
Island hostility to the French presence
in the region.
Overall, developments over the past
year have strengthened the position of
Flosse and Tahoeraa. Their majority in
the Territorial Assembly was rein-
forced by the Here Ai'a defectors and
by Ai'a Api changing sides. Tahoeraa's
fortunes received a further boost with
the election of its favored candidate to
the French presidency, followed by a
strong performance in the municipal
elections. In addition, the opposition
was in disarray. With the virtual
demise of Juventin and Here Ai'a, and
Alexandre Uontieff languishing in
prison, Tavini constitutes the only
organized opposition. Yet Tavini's
influence is constrained by holding just
4 seats in the 41-seat Territorial
Assembly. The one factor detracting
from Tahoeraa's grip on territorial pol-
itics is that the government, and Flosse
personally, have become associated
with the unpopular decision to resume
testing. Nevertheless, a pronuclear
position has not done Flosse much
harm in the past, and the Tahoeraa
party appears well placed for the terri-
torial elections due in 1996.
KARIN VON STROKIRCH
MAORI ISSUES
During 1994, the New Zealand gov-
ernment sorely tested Maori patience
in respect of settling grievances arising
from breaches of the Treaty of Wai-
tangi. On Waitangi Day (the day on
which the signing of the Treaty of
Waitangi and the birth of the nation of
New Zealand is commemorated), 6
February 1995, Maoridom's anger
boiled over for all the world to see and
the commemorations at Waitangi had
to be truncated. In the months that fol-
lowed more than twenty instances of
different tribal groupings taking over
and reoccupying lands that had been
stolen from them were reported in the
national media. Many more took place
quietly, away from the glare of media
attention.
For the first time in many a decade
Maori were almost totally united on
an issue. The country had watched the
government's stance move from a
swaggering confidence that it had
finally found the solution to Maori
grievances, to hurt and bewilderment
as one by one each of the major tribal
groupings totally rejected the govern-
ment's proposals for settlement, to out-
bursts of indignation at increasingly
vocal Maori demands for Maori sover-
eignty, and finally, to a very quiet
admission that they had totally mis-
read and underestimated Maoridom.
Seeds of Maori discontent with the
present government had started to
mature in 1992 over the settlement of
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fisheries claims. The Maori negotiators
were men chosen by the Crown and
none of them held or sought a mandate
on the final terms of the settlement.
Negotiations were reportedly con-
ducted with strong emotional over-
tones. Such simple commercial
considerations as the size and value
of the fishing resource, and a careful
examination of the viability of either
the international fishing industry or
the fishing company purchased as part
of the settlement deal, were accorded
very little attention.
The settlement deal exchanged the
exclusively Maori right to a multi-
billion-dollar fishing resource for a
NZ$IS0 million half share in the fish-
ing company, 10 percent of all fishing
quotas, a Crown-appointed commis-
sion to allocate the quota among the
tribes, and a reduction of customary
fishing rights from full protection
under the law, to regulations to be pro-
mulgated by the minister of fisheries.
Despite a huge outcry from many
tribes once Maori gained access to the
Deed of Settlement, the government
and the negotiators remained firm, and
legislation was rapidly put in place
preventing any further legal action by
Maori against the Crown in respect of
commercial fishing rights.
Then early in 1994, Maori had the
option of enrolling on the Maori elec-
toral roll. In the past large numbers of
Maori have simply not taken part in
general elections and were not regis-
tered voters. The advent of the new
system of mixed member proportional
representation was seen as an opportu-
nity to improve Maori participation in
the electoral process and increase the
number of Maori seats in Parliament
from 4 (out of 96) to possibly 7 or 8 (if
all eligible Maori adults were to regis-
ter). However, the opportunity for
Maori to register was very poorly
advertised, and at the end of a very
short period allowed for enrollment,
the number of those enrolled had
increased sufficiently to allow only one
extra seat. Despite Maori protest and
(unsuccessful) legal action, the govern-
ment refused to reconduct the enroll-
ments to ensure proper coverage of the
Maori population. Maori discontent
with the government's attitude was
increasing.
Throughout 1994 rumors emanated
from Wellington about Crown propos-
als being drawn up for the settlement
of Treaty of Waitangi claims. However,
Maori, whether tribal representatives
or state servants were not permitted to
take part in drawing up the proposals.
Alarm grew as very oppressive and
divisive parts of the proposals were
leaked to the media. In October an ex-
civil servant of the Ngati Kahu tribe of
the north, Mike Smith, successfully
brought the matter to the nation's
attention by attempting to cut down a
very prominent tree on the Auckland
skyline, the lone (nonindigenous) pine
tree that stands on One Tree Hill. The
incident caused outrage in Auckland in
particular, but the media also gave very
good coverage of the reasons for the
protest.
Although some Maori condemned
the action, most gave strong support to
the political statement it made about
the government's refusal to give proper
consideration to the settlement of the
more than five hundred claims cur-
rently before the Waitangi Tribunal.
Only approximately IS percent of
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these claims have been investigated
and reported on. The great majority of
the reports from the tribunal have been
a great embarrassment to the Crown,
and they clearly wish to avoid any fur-
ther information about breaches of the
treaty being publicized through this
forum.
In early December the government
published its Crown Proposals for the
Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi
Claims. Maoridom's worst fears were
confirmed. The proposals sought to
restrict the investigation into and set-
tlement of all treaty claims to a process
of direct negotiation between Maori
and the Crown. But the proposals
stated that the Crown would com-
pletely control the negotiations and
settlement process and that essentially
once the Crown had decided what
each tribe could have in compensation
for breaches of the treaty in their par-
ticular territory, that would be the end
of the matter. Maori would have to
forgo any and all legal remedies once
they started to talk to the Crown, but
would have to accept that before the
Crown started talking to them, it
would have already decided what the
settlement would be. Tribes, however,
would not know what the proposed
settlement was before they talked to
the Crown. All tribal settlements
would be full and final, and tribes
could not return in later years once
other breaches were uncovered. This
condition was proposed even though
most tribes have still to carry out
research on the full extent of the
breaches in their areas.
The Crown would then consult with
different tribes regarding what they
thought the extent of another tribe's
settlement should be, a clear attempt
to set tribe against tribe. Furthermore,
although the present law allows only
Crown land to be used to settle claims,
most of that would not be available to
be used for settlement. The proposals
simply decreed that lands held for
"conservation purposes," which
amounts to one-third of the country,
would not be available for settlement.
It is no coincidence that most tribal
claims include large areas of "conser-
vation" lands.
Likewise the Crown would not
return natural resources such as water,
river and lake beds, geothermal energy,
foreshores and seabeds, sand, shingle,
and minerals, even though the treaty
guaranteed Maori full, exclusive, and
undisturbed possession of everything
they valued. Similarly lands that Maori
had gifted in the past for certain pur-
poses, but had been sold or used for
other purposes by the Crown, would
not be returned unless particular
restrictive conditions were applied.
The final insult came when a fiscal
limit of NZ$ I billion dollars was put
on the total value of all assets returned
(including the I992 fisheries settle-
ment) plus the expenses associated
with bringing the claims and reaching
a settlement. By the time the Proposals
were published, over one-third of that
budget had already been expended.
Within four months a tribal settlement
of NZ$ no million reduced the avail-
able settlement pool to just over half
a billion dollars.
The government naively misread the
initial silence over their proposals as
indicating a measure of acceptance.
Late in January I995, Sir Hepi Te
Heuheu, the paramount chief of the
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Tuwharetoa tribe of the central North
Island convened a national hui (gather-
ing) of all tribes to discuss the propos-
als. Tuwharetoa has never lost its
mana ariki because they were one of
the very few tribes who managed to
retain their land base. At the hui
Maoridom indicated very clearly that
they found the proposals most insult-
ing and unanimously rejected them.
They called for some basic changes to
the country's constitution so that these
matters could be properly dealt with.
The government responded by
referring to the people who attended
the hui, who included a great many of
Maoridom's elder statesmen and
women, as a bunch of radicals. Those
leaders chose not to get into a person-
alities slanging match and simply did
not respond to the insults. But the
insults were not taken lightly, and
Maoridom's anger boiled over for all
to see at the Waitangi Day celebrations
the following week. Protesters success-
fully disrupted the proceedings,
replaced the New Zealand flag with a
Maori independence flag, taunted and
insulted the prime minister and other
members of his cabinet in attendance
until the minister of Internal Affairs
finally canceled the rest of the proceed-
ings.
The media went into a frenzy, with
wildly varying reports of what had
happened. The prime minister vowed
to abolish Waitangi Day and attacked
Maoridom for not keeping its radicals
under control. Threats of prosecutions
against protesters resulted in only one
arrest. A conviction for spitting at the
governor-general was later achieved
by the Crown, and the protester was
eventually jailed for six months. Maori
commentators noted that it appeared
that this one person had had to bear
the brunt of Pakeha anger for what
had happened at Waitangi and that, in
deciding the sentence, scant regard had
been paid to the far worse indignities
and atrocities that Maori had experi-
enced at the hands of the Crown over
the past one hundred fifty years.
In the months following Waitangi
Day a series of occupations took place
where different tribes in different parts
of the North Island publicly reoccu-
pied lands that had been stolen from
them. The media again went into a
frenzy, with demands that occupiers be
removed. Initially some authorities
signaled that they might use heavy-
handed tactics. All that achieved was
huge influxes of supporters, both
Maori and Pakeha, from all parts of
the country, to assist the occupiers. At
one site in Auckland, however, occu-
piers where forcibly removed in full
view of the media. The result was that
private purchasers to whom the gov-
ernment had offered the land refused
to complete the sale.
In March, despite the obvious out-
rage of Maoridom at its proposals, the
government embarked on a series of
consultative hui around the country to
get a "true" gauge of Maori opinion.
Only at this stage did the government
call on its Maori state servants to assist
with the consultation process. Staff of
the Ministry of Maori Development
were sent ahead of ministers in an
attempt to smooth the path for them.
These staff came under severe attack
wherever they went, and reports
appeared in the media about them suf-
fering from "battle fatigue." Within
six weeks of the end of the consultative
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round, the chief executive of the minis-
try announced his resignation.
A t everyone of the thirteen hui
called, the proposals were once again
rejected. Slowly, the minister of treaty
negotiations started to concede that
maybe the government had misread
the situation. He acknowledged that
Maori did not accept that conservation
lands could not be used for settlement,
or that gifted lands should only be
returned under certain conditions. He
also accepted that the Crown alone
could not determine and control the
negotiation and settlement process. He
went as far as saying that Maori self-
determination and a Maori parliament
were not pipe dreams and deserved
serious consideration and open debate
by all New Zealanders. But the prime
minister was quick to squash any
notions of Maori sovereignty, stoutly
declaring that there could only ever be
one Parliament and one law for all.
By late May and June the govern-
ment was sending out feelers to see if it
could perhaps settle some of the bigger
claims before next year's general elec-
tion. Again it chose to seek the advice
of the fisheries negotiators it had cho-
sen in 1992, but this time the tribes
moved to stop those individuals selling
them out again. At present the media is
reporting major disruptions among
some tribes as they try to rein in lead-
ers who no longer hold the tribal man-




The year 1994-95 was one in which
political partisanship took new forms
in Niue's politics. In December 1994
the 20-member Niue Assembly became
deadlocked when the opposition
failed to pass a motion of no confi-
dence. The 10-10 vote came in what
was the third motion of no confidence
brought against the administration of
Premier Frank Lui in 1994.
The first, oddly enough, resulted in
the government retaining office with
an increased majority (Levine 1995,
157-158). A second motion, intro-
duced in the Assembly in November
1994, embraced somewhat convo-
luted logistical, constitutional, and
political calculations. As has occurred
previously, the motion was submitted
while Cabinet ministers were overseas.
Because Niue's constitution (section 6
[2]) provides that the motion must
come before the Assembly within ten
days, the two ministers, Terry Coe and
Sani Lakatani (half the Cabinet), were
able to return to Niue, and so save the
government from defeat, only by
catching the one flight per week to the
island. Matters became more compli-
cated when Lakatani, who had lost his
finance portfolio during a Cabinet
reshuffle in October (he retained
responsibilities for economic develop-
ment), resigned from the Cabinet on 8
November, two days before the sched-
uled debate on the no-confidence
motion. That debate never took place,
however, as Niue's chief justice upheld
a challenge to the vote that had been
filed in the High Court by Premier Lui.
Justice Dillon ruled that the motion of
no confidence was unconstitutional
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and invalid, because it had not been
moved by the required minimum of
four Assembly members "who are
not Ministers" (section 6 [I] [b]). As
there was no longer any motion to
debate, the Assembly did not have to
convene until called by the Speaker
at the request of the premier (section
22 [I]). The opposition, which could
have presented a new and constitu-
tionally valid motion, was, at least
momentarily, thoroughly outmaneu-
vered.
The nine days in November
between the introduction of the second
no-confidence motion and the chief
justice's decision saw an unprecedented
campaign by the premier, Cabinet min-
isters, and progovernment Assembly
members, involving rallies and meet-
ings in Niue's villages at which people
were urged to persuade their represen-
tatives to support the government. As
with previous attempts to unseat the
government, the dispute in the Assem-
bly was reflected in divisions not only
around the island but within the fami-
lies of the twenty Assembly members
as well.
By late November the opposition
had regrouped, declaring itself the
Niue People's Party. Its parliamentary
leader was Young Vivian and its
spokesman, and later its president, was
the former secretary to government,
Terry Chapman, who had been
defeated in a bid for election to the
Assembly at the 1993 general election.
On 7 December, the next sitting of the
Assembly, 1994'S third motion of no
confidence was moved, with Chapman
claiming that internal divisions within
the Cabinet were causing political
instability and that there had been no
progress for Niue under the island's
current leadership.
As the vote approached, Premier
Lui, 58, a former New Zealand public
servant and at one time a New
Zealand champion wrestler, was
reportedly considering holding a snap
election in a bid to prevent his ouster.
His constitutional options were lim-
ited, however. Under Niue's constitu-
tion (section 6 [3]) the premier would
have had five days after losing a no-
confidence vote to determine whether
to resign or call an early election. If he
chose an election, it would have to be
called within six weeks (section 26
[2]); otherwise, the constitution pro-
hibits governments from calling elec-
tions (except when defeated on
confidence motions in the Assembly)
earlier than three months before the
expiry of its three-year term (section
26 [I] [b]). Consequently, the earliest
date for an election called by the pre-
mier would be December 1995.
In January 1995, in the aftermath of
the 10-10 vote, the opposition lodged
an appeal to the governor-general of
Niue (and of New Zealand), Dame
Catherine Tizard, resident in Welling-
ton, urging her to intervene to end the
"hung Assembly" stalemate by dissolv-
ing the Assembly and calling for new
elections. The next month, following
consultations, Dame Catherine
rejected the opposition's petition, say-
ing there were no constitutionally valid
reasons for her to become involved in
what was essentially a political dis-
pute.
Although the premier has argued
subsequently that he still has a man-
date to govern, the opposition has
made it difficult for him to do so. Only
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three bills have been enacted since the
10-IO vote and these were passed
while members of the opposition were
not present in the Assembly, which
meets infrequently. The Niue People's
Party has prevented passage of legisla-
tion (relevant to a New Zealand-
funded tourism project) to set up a
Niue tourist authority, a success that
marks the first time government legis-
lation has been blocked since New
Zealand granted self-government in
1974·
Following the failure of the tourist
authority bill to pass its second reading
in the Assembly, and faced with the
Niue People's Party's declared commit-
ment to prevent consideration of all
motions and legislation, the govern-
ment withdrew further bills. Instead, it
resurrected a twenty-five-year-old
colonial ordinance (introduced in 1970
by New Zealand) as the means of
establishing the four-person tourist
board, which is responsible for mar-
keting, tourism promotion, and plan-
ning. Its establishment was considered
both vital and urgent, because New
Zealand had indicated it would no
longer provide special funding to a
tourist authority unless a formal statu-
tory body were set up to administer the
funds.
The premier has vowed to govern
even if the opposition were successful
in blocking passage of the govern-
ment's budget, which was presented to
the Assembly (which neither approved
nor rejected it) in late June. Its passage
could be deferred for some months, as
25 percent of the government's budget
can be spent in advance of Assembly
approval. However, the failure to pass
an appropriation bill would begin to
193
present difficulties by late September
or early October: a particularly awk-
ward time, as Niue commemorates the
twenty-first anniversary of Constitu-
tion Day on 20 October and large cele-
brations are planned. Indeed, the Lui
administration scaled down the annual
event in 1994, saving its energies and
resources as it looked ahead to a major
event in 1995 to which Pacific Island
leaders and dignitaries were to be
invited. Premier Lui, having in effect
deprived himself of presiding over the
1994 celebrations, wants to remain in
office at the very least through the
1995 Constitution Day festivities.
The Niue People's Party claims to be
ready for an early election, with candi-
dates selected for each of the twenty
Assembly seats and a party platform
being developed. The approach to gov-
ernment taken by its leading figures,
including Lakatani, is more in keeping
with the stance taken by Niue's first
(and longest serving) premier, Sir
Robert Rex, favoring more interven-
tionist policies for the state based on
ongoing support from the New
Zealand government and other aid
donors. This stance, which tends to see
Niue's economic development as inevi-
tably dependent on externally sup-
ported government programs, is at
variance with New Zealand's resources
and priorities. These have led to cuts in
recent years in assistance for budgetary
purposes (which went hand in hand
with a major reduction in the size of
Niue's public service). The Lui govern-
ment, seeking to move Niue forward in
such an environment, has been seeking
to reduce Niue's dependence on New
Zealand and on government initia-
tives.
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Although the island has been polar-
ized by the political stalemate, the gov-
ernment has taken a relaxed attitude
toward developments. The apparent
rise of party politics on Niue, and the
legislative stalemate that has been one
of the immediate consequences, marks
an important change for Niue's poli-
tics. Previously, Niue could be charac-
terized as a "no party" state, its
elections and constitutional govern-
ment proceeding without aid (or hin-
drance) from formal party structures.
Sir Robert Rex saw this as a virtue,
advising me, in December 1980, in an
interview in his office in Niue's capital,
Alofi, that Niue had no need of party
politics, that its introduction would be
contrary to the Niuean way, and that
party competition would prove too
divisive for Niue's small size and lim-
ited population.
But party politics was not the only
cause for division on Niue during
1995. Cabinet declared a seventy-
seven-year-old Australian priest,
Father Kevin Glover, who had been
resident for five years, to be a threat to
the "peace, order and good govern-
ment" of Niue and ordered him
deported. In response, Father Glover
took legal action to prevent the order
being carried out, and in due course
the dispute between the government
and the priest brought Niue some
rare (if unwelcome) publicity. Father
Glover and Premier Lui (among others)
featured in an inquiry (not very favor-
able to the government's position)
broadcast in New Zealand and the
Pacific on the television program,
"Sixty Minutes."
The government maintained that
allegations made by Father Glover
meant that he was no longer physically
safe on the island and that, in any case,
his conduct had breached the terms of
his residence permit. Minister of Edu-
cation O'Love Tauveve Jacobsen
claimed that Father Glover had been
"culturally insensitive" and that his
deportation would send a message
overseas that Niue's laws were to be
upheld and Niueans respected. While
the premier accepted that Father
Glover had not broken any laws, he
argued that his departure was neces-
sary following some of the critical
statements he had made (that were
broadcast on Niue).
Inevitably the dispute became asso-
ciated with freedom-of-expression
issues. Chair of the Niue Broadcasting
Corporation Tiva Tongatule reported
that the premier had told her to with-
draw Father Glover's radio prayer pro-
gram because the "prayers" contained
too much political content, including
personal criticism of government offi-
cials. Despite some concerns about
government censorship, the program
was banned on the grounds that its
content did not meet the criteria set
down by the broadcasting corporation.
A complaint about the material had
also been made by Jacobsen, whose
responsibilities include religious affairs
and broadcasting.
Other conflicts involving freedom
of expression arose as feelings about
Father Glover's deportation order, and
the possibility of government censor-
ship, became more heated. Although it
was argued that Father Glover's criti-
cisms could be expressed in Niue's
weekly newspaper, the Niue Stat;
rather than through the broadcast
media, the newspaper was also
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attacked by the premier for biased
political reporting. Furthermore John
Rex-Woods, an Australian economic
adviser employed for two years by the
government and the husband of the
paper's former part owner-editor, was
also served with a deportation order
that was subsequently challenged in
the High Court.
Although there are only about one
hundred forty Catholics on Niue, a
petition circulated on the island, sup-
porting Father Glover and calling on
the government not to proceed with
the deportation order, gathered a large
number of signatures (about half of the
adult population). Some of this sup-
port arose as the controversy merged
with pro- and antigovernment senti-
ments: the Niue People's Party, not
surprisingly, backed Father Glover,
supporting the petition at least in part
as an antigovernment move.
In April I995 the case was
adjourned after a ten-hour hearing.
Niue's chief justice, noting that the
issue was polarizing Niue and that it
was in everyone's best interest to reach
what he described as a voluntary solu-
tion, asked lawyers representing the
government and Father Glover to try
to resolve matters out of court. Fol-
lowing this request, the Niue Cabinet
met to reconsider its position and
agreed to revoke the expulsion order
on condition that Father Glover "vol-
untarily" leave Niue by the end of
June. This approach, it was stated,
would provide Father Glover with the
chance to leave with dignity while pre-
serving Cabinet's view that he was no
longer welcome on the island.
With matters still unresolved,
Father Glover found it necessary to
leave Niue for medical treatment,
delaying court proceedings. However,
on his return to Niue, legal proceed-
ings resumed. When the Cabinet's deci-
sion was read out to him, the chief
justice announced that he was happy
that the out-of-court settlement had
been reached, saying that it had been
resolved "the Niue way." On the
priest's departure the deportation
order was to be canceled. At the same
time the Catholic Church was to pro-
vide a replacement for Father Glover,
whose other legal dispute, a defama-
tion suit, came to an end when he
apologized to education officials who
had brought the action against him.
Apart from his involvement in the
second no-confidence motion and the
Father Glover dispute, the chief justice
was also prominent in emphasizing the
need on Niue for a women's support
group to help victims of sexual abuse.
He made this statement during the
sentencing of three men on separate
charges of indecent assault and incest,
saying that he found it incredible to
learn that a victim had been shunned
by her extended family and by people
in her village after reporting the
offenses. The needs of Pacific Island
women were also on the agenda at the
third meeting of Pacific Island women
television producers, held at Alofi in
December. The gathering, which
included women from Fiji, Western
Samoa, the Cook Islands, and Niue,
was part of a UNESCO project encour-
aging more participation by women
and a greater emphasis on locally pro-
duced television programs.
Niue's growing participation in
international and regional organiza-
tions was also reflected at the United
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Nations social summit in Copenhagen.
Niue's national planning and economic
development minister, Aokuso Pavihi,
stated at the summit that many Pacific
Island countries had been denied the
assistance needed to develop. Describ-
ing Niue as a welfare state, the minis-
ter put the blame on the international
community, arguing that "failures of
the development efforts so optimisti-
cally handed out in the '60S have put
Niue there": "it is time to lend a hand
to reverse this situation." Another
move toward greater external involve-
ment saw Niue attend the Asian Devel-
opment Bank conference in New
Zealand as an observer. Niue has since
applied for membership of the bank,
which would make it eligible for loans
and technical assistance.
As for Niue's ongoing challenges-
retaining its population and promoting
economic viability-the year 1994-95
brought mixed developments. The
island experienced its first recorded
instance of population growth for
twenty years, with numbers rising by
82 (to 2321) since 1991. In October
1994 public servants received their
first pay raise in six years, the govern-
ment awarding a 10 percent cost-of-
living allowance. However, a review
found the economy stagnant, with a
lack of confidence in the business sec-
tor; tourism was described as at an all-
time low, its poor performance in turn
having a dramatic (and negative) effect
throughout the island's economy.
One sparkling success was a taro
export program, which earned
US$74,000 for growers (mostly former
public servants made redundant by
budget cuts) in one month alone. The
record shipments of taro to Auckland
were carried on the Cook Islands
National Line and brought nearly half
a million New Zealand dollars into
Niue's economy in the twelve-month
period. Even this silver lining was not
untarnished, however, as agriculture
officials warned producers not to
replant plantations for up to five years
or to clear rainforest prematurely.
Niue's soil cannot sustain frequent
rotational cropping, and overuse of
land would have devastating long-term
effects for its agricultural productivity.
Despite the earnings from taro
exports, levels of bank deposits
remained low, government revenue
was below expectations, and a task
force was appointed to consider new
taxes. These might include increased
port charges, a 10 percent duty on all
imports, introduction of a sales tax,
payment for water supplies (now pro-
vided free), and a closer scrutiny of
personal and company tax returns.
The Niue government remains the
envy of many governments in one
respect: it is debt free, and conse-
quently the proportion of its budget
required for debt servicing is nil.
With privatization having reduced
the range and magnitude of govern-
ment-run services, some further sales,
including Niue's radio station and the
lucrative state-owned liquor stores, are
being contemplated. With news, public
affairs, and even religious programs
sensitive topics, control over broad-
casting is bound to remain a delicate
matter. So too is anything to do with
the sale and distribution of alcoholic
beverages, as evidenced by the Assem-
bly's rejection of a proposal that would
have allowed the sale of beer in Niue's
villages. The proposal had generated
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strong opposition from church leaders,
which is not to say that Niue is "dry":
there are seven licensed premises on
the island.
Another perennial problem for
Niue, ensuring the stability of air
transportation links necessary for tour-
ist development, was back on the
agenda. Air Nauru is now the only air-
line with regularly scheduled flights to
Niue, with a weekly service between
Auckland and Niue. Polynesian Air-
lines' service was discontinued in Sep-
tember 1994, and there is now no
scheduled air link between Niue and
Rarotonga. However, Niue may have
direct air services with Tonga and
Western Samoa in the near future,
following discussions with Royal
Tongan Airways regarding a
Nuku'alofa-Niue-Apia service.
New Zealand's major aid project on
Niue centers on the extension of the
airport runway, which would permit a
fully loaded 737-400 to fly to Auck-
land without refueling in Tonga. With
tourism considered the way forward
for Niue, the project to extend the air-
port runway has a "field of dreams"
character to it: "build it and they will
come." The land being used for the
runway extension was acquired by the
government from six families. Follow-
ing an independent valuation, the gov"
ernment offered the families a sum
one-third higher than the land's market
value. Ultimately, however, the govern-
ment needed to use its powers to take
land after negotiations with the land-
owners failed to produce an agreement
on compensation. There was also dis-
agreement over conditions of land use,
and the matter went to arbitration by
Niue's Land Court. Nevertheless ten-
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ders were called in May, the extensions
to be carried out by a New Zealand
company (and project manager) using
Niuean labor. The 690-meter exten-
sion will cost Nz$6.9 million.
Concerns about Niue's fragile envi-
ronment led to a ban in March on the
import of beer bottles and small car-
tons of fruit juices and soft drinks. The
step was taken to prevent bottles and
drink cartons from littering the road-
side. Ironically, this follows the suc-
cessful development of a program to
collect beer and soft-drink cans from
around Niue, for export and recycling
overseas (Levine 1994, 189). The per-
son responsible for developing that
program, who will not now be remem-
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TOKELAU
A United Nations Mission visited
Tokelau in July-August 1994, follow-
ing earlier visits by UN missions in
1976, 1981, and 1986. The mission,
which included representatives from
Chile, Papua New Guinea, Sierra
Leone, and Tunisia, was accompanied
by Administrator of Tokelau Lindsay
Watt and held meetings with the lead-
ership and people of Tokelau on each
of the three atolls. What especially dis-
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tinguished this mission was that it
heard first from the three atolls sepa-
rately, and then, at the end, for the first
time, from the people of Tokelau
together, speaking with one voice
through the Ulu-o-Tokelau (head of
Tokelau).
As Tokelau has no airstrips, the mis-
sion traveled by freighter (a two-day
voyage) from Western Samoa, arriving
first in Atafu. They were welcomed by
the pulenuku (village mayor), who
thanked the United Nations for its sup-
port, mentioning in particular the par-
ticipation by the UN Development
Program in the building of a seawall
and the implementation of Tokelau's
water management program. Bearing
in mind that the mission was to con-
sider progress toward an act of self-
determination in Tokelau, the
pulenuku took the opportunity to
remind the mission of Tokelau's
refusal, years earlier, to become part of
either Western Samoa or the Cook
Islands. The faipule (elected head of
each atoll), in his address, also empha-
sized Tokelau's desire to continue its
relationship with New Zealand.
Atafu's taupulega (council of elders)
took the opportunity to remind the
mission of the unity of Tokelauans,
bound by a common language and
ancestry. Although aware that the year
2000 is the General Assembly's target
date for the eradication of colonialism,
the elders argued that the time frame
did not allow them sufficient time to
comprehend fully the implications of a
final act of self-determination, nor did
it enable them to ensure a secure foun-
dation for Tokelau's future.
Arriving next at Nukunonu, the vis-
itors were informed by the faipule that
despite apprehensions associated with
an act of self-determination, the com-
munity were becoming increasingly
ready to proceed with it because a
decision would give them more control
over their own affairs. However, the
pulenuku expressed concern over the
question, noting Tokelau's past self-
sufficiency, when "almost nothing was
imported and when good, practical
items were made of locally produced
or available materials" (UN I994, I2).
With Tokelau now heavily dependent
on imports, he questioned whether it
would have the necessary resources to
sustain its present level of development
following the act of self-determination,
and concluded that more time was
needed to assess Tokelau's financial
capabilities. This view was echoed at
an informal meeting with representa-
tives of the community, at which the
mission was advised of Tokelau's need
for improved telecommunications links
and "the development of a better sea
transport system and the construction
of airstrips on the atolls," all of these
priorities needing to be resolved
"before addressing the question of self-
determination" (UN 1994,13). The
absence of a direct transportation link
with New Zealand (all contacts must
pass through Western Samoa) was also
stressed, participants reiterating that
they would be in no position to make a
decision on self-determination before
the year 2000.
On Fakaofo the mission's meeting
with the taupulega elicited comment
on other issues. The acting faipule
raised the question of Swains Island
(Levine 1992, 207-208), stating that
in the past the chief of Fakaofo had
instructed people to live there. The act-
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ing faipule stated that advice had been
received that suggested it would be
better to address the question of
returning Swains to Tokelau prior to
the exercise of Tokelau's right to self-
determination. Even the ulu's "solemn
declaration," delivered to the UN mis-
sion on 30 July in the name of "the
emerging nation of Tokelau," made
reference to this territorial claim. In his
opening remarks of welcome he told
the visitors "you have now visited all
the three atolls of Tokelau and, accord-
ing to our forefathers, sailed past the
fourth" (UN I994, 26).
The mission's report to the United
Nations' fourth committee, the Special
Political and Decolonization Commit-
tee, concluded that the people of Toke-
lau were "ready and willing, although
not without a natural apprehension, to
continue evolving politically, economi-
cally and socially." The mission
described Tokelau's National Strategic
Plan, "which contains the principles
that will chart the course for the nation
of Tokelau," as "a document of great
importance," and considered recent
moves toward greater internal self-
government a "necessary step on the
path to self-determination." It con-
cluded that the people of Tokelau
"were all in favor of assuming more
responsibility in conducting their own
affairs, and that they were well on
their way to building nationhood and
becoming self-governing." While not-
ing a preference, "expressed unambig-
uously," for "a future status of free
association with New Zealand," the
mission also observed that "the exact
content and nature of this free associa-
tion" required "further discussion."
There were some reflections on the
voyage to and from Tokelau: "the Mis-
sion had the opportunity to experience
firsthand the hazardous conditions
under which passengers and cargo
were ferried from ship to shore and
recommends that appropriate facilities,
including improvement of the access
channels and the building of wharves,
should be taken under active consid-
eration" (UN I994, 22-25). The mis-
sion also gave its support to the fur-
ther studies proposed by the New
Zealand government of the feasibility
of constructing at least one airport in
Tokelau.
On 9 December I994 the General
Assembly adopted a resolution that
noted "with appreciation that for the
first time Tokelau came together as one
people and one nation ... in order to
address the question of Tokelau's act
of self-determination." The resolution
went on to confirm that in its view
the people of Tokelau retained the
"inalienable right" to "self-determina-
tion and independence," notwith-
standing "such factors as territorial
size, geographical location, size of pop-
ulation and limited natural resources."
The General Assembly also took note
of the "solemn declaration read by the
Ulu-o-Tokelau" and the "strong pref-
erence for a future status of free associ-
ation with New Zealand," as well as
progress being made toward the attain-
ment of self-government under a con-
stitution.
These developments involving Toke-
lau, New Zealand, and the United
Nations took place against the back-
ground of Tokelau's newly approved
National Strategic Plan, adopted in
June I994 (Levine I995, I63)· The
plan was designed to set forth some of
200 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 1996
the cultural assumptions underlying
the political and social direction Toke-
lau is seeking to take. It establishes a
Tokelauan consensus about fundamen-
tal cultural commitments from the out-
set: "Tokelau is permanently founded
on God. This foundation is manifested
in the way the country and its people
cooperate; live peacefully; live hap-
pily." The plan also includes sections
on government ("we value the voice of
all our people in all the decisions we
make"), culture ("we will place first
and continue to value our culture and
customs"), learning ("we place great
importance on the learning of things
Tokelau, we also value modern knowl-
edge"), and the nation itself ("the pro-
cesses we use for the raising of our
families will be the same methods we
will use to make national decisions").
A section on "beliefs," describing
aspects of "the Tokelau way," con-
cludes with an affirmation that "our
way of life is based on Christian and
Tokelau values which provide a way
for people to live peacefully; be honest;
respect each other." As a plan for
future development, there is also a
statement of Tokelau's "weaknesses,"
focusing on threats to cultural integ-
rity, resource scarcity, the need for
greater accountability and improve-
ments to the public service, and,
finally, the observation that "there are
almost no symbols that signify that
Tokelau is a country."
Reviewing Tokelau's foreign rela-
tions-its "external opportunities"-
the plan emphasizes difficulties Toke-
lau has experienced "due to our con-
tacts with the outside world." These
have contributed to the weakening of
"important elements of our culture,"
environmental degradation, adverse
effects on health, and encroachments
"in our waters" by foreign fishing
vessels.
Concluding with a "Challenge for
the Future," the plan reviews"critical
issues" and the steps needed "to rem-
edy our weaknesses." An undertaking
was made to "develop and adopt
national symbols," including a
national anthem, a national flag, and
national color(s), and to establish links
with other countries and organizations
wherever possible. All deliberations
and decisions were to be considered
against the background of one overrid-
ing question: "How will Tokelau's cul-
ture, environment, health and
international relations be affected
by this decision?"
Although Tokelau's is a predomi-
nantly oral culture, the national plan
was but one of two documents to gain
prominence during the year I994-95.
The other, the "Voice of Tokelau," was
presented to the UN mission on the
last day of its visit in the presence of,
and on behalf of, the elders, Council of
Faipule, the three pulenuku, and repre-
sentatives of the women, youth, and
churches. "Today," it stated, "we come
together as Tokelau." What was
unique was that "for the very first time
in its history, and on its own soil,
Tokelau is talking to the United
Nations as one people, and one
nation." Describing "changes in atti-
tude" and "a new assertiveness," the
ulu drew attention to a "new sense of
nationalism" stemming, in part, from a
desire "to halt the process of erosion
of [Tokelau's] cultural norms": "in the
pursuit of making its act of self deter-
mination, Tokelau is determined that it
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should not undermine its social, reli-
gious and cultural values." The
National Strategic Plan, the embodi-
ment of Tokelau's "dreams and
hopes," was "a rudder for Tokelau's
canoe"; its constitution, whose devel-
opment was now underway, would
"provide the trunk from which a new
canoe to carry Tokelau into the next
century will be carved." The ulu stated
that Tokelau would have a national
flag approved during 1995. Also on
the agenda, and stressed by the ulu,
were plans to advance self-government
(through amendments to New Zea-
land's Tokelau Act) by giving Tokelau
a national legislative power to match
its newly acquired executive authority
and judicial structure.
In his annual report to the New
Zealand Parliament, summarizing the
progress being made toward an act of
self-determination, Tokelau's adminis-
trator referred to the effort to "devise a
long-term relationship with New
Zealand which provides necessary
reassurance, yet allows Tokelau to
stand taller, its pride and dignity
intact, while fulfilling its instinctive
desire to be self-reliant to the greatest
extent possible." The result, he noted,
was likely to be "a Tokelauan Consti-
tution, rather than a Constitution for
Tokelau copied heavily from constitu-
tions elsewhere." The year 1995 has
been declared Tokelau's "Year of the
Constitution," and workshops on con-
stitutional issues are being held on
each atoll. In May 1995 Tokelau's spe-
cial representative told the UN special
committee's subcommittee on small
territories that these constitutional
workshops had both "reinforced the
concept of the nuku (village) being the
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foundation stone from which the
nation of Tokelau is to grow" and
demonstrated that "Tokelau is already
functioning as a nation, as one peo-
ple," the "desire to become 'one' " as
well as "three" very much in evidence.
Tokelau's special representative
transmitted a message from the Coun-
cil of Faipule that reviewed recent
developments: "the delegation of pow-
ers of the Administrator in January
1994, the coming together of the three
atolls to build a National Strategic
Plan in June, and the delivery of the
'Voice of Tokelau' to the United
Nations Visiting Mission in July."
These were characterized as "the
springboard from which Tokelau is
launching its search for an act of self-
determination appropriate to its size,
location and institutions, both
modern and traditional." In similar
spirit was a statement by the admin-
istrator in November 1994 to the
taupulega of each atoll, telling them
that they "had a unique chance to
become the founding fathers of the
new nation which itself would serve
to re-empower traditional village
institutions. "
The administrator delivered a state-
ment to the UN subcommittee in May
1995, noting Tokelau's stated wish
(through the "Voice of Tokelau" and
the National Strategic Plan) to assert
its distinctive character and to be as
self-reliant as possible. But he observed
that Tokelau had indicated its ongoing
need for "a partner" and concluded:
"Really the bottom line for Tokelau is
quite simple. Here is a precariously sit-
uated country of 1600 people whose
long-term security would be signifi-
cantly enhanced under free association
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of a style that fosters the feeling that
Tokelau retains a meaningful connec-
tion with a wider whole, and thereby
achieves not only the human connec-
tion, but also the possibility for
broader material support and assis-
tance."
As part of the effort to devise a con-
stitution and gain greater insight into
political status alternatives, the Coun-
cil of Faipule has held talks in New
Zealand, Fiji, Niue, Western Samoa,
and Tuvalu. A national competition to
design and approve a national flag has
been launched. Tokelau's principal pol-
icy-making body, the General Fono
(General Council), has decided to
allow Tokelauans living in New Zea-
land to send representatives to Fono
meetings. This step reaffirms links
among Tokelauans generally and is
consistent with efforts to attract expa-
triate Tokelauans back to Tokelau. A
meeting held by the UN mission with
Tokelauans resident in New Zealand
found that most wanted to retain a
voice in Tokelau's affairs. There was
support for the "Voice of Tokelau," a
preference for free association with
New Zealand, and backing for the
direction taken by Tokelau's leadership
with respect to constitutional develop-
ments leading toward a future act of
self-determination.
The concerns about Tokelau's tele-
communications and transport links
are being addressed. Progress is being
made toward using a satellite earth sta-
tion for communications purposes,
while alternatives to the freighter used
by the UN mission are being explored
(as a matter of some urgency because
the charter arrangement has come to
an end). The question of airstrips, con-
sidered in the past (but rejected by
Tokelau), is back on the agenda, with a
principal issue continuing to center on
a willingness to sacrifice scarce land
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THE KINGDOM OF TONGA
The formation and naming of Tonga's
first political party, in August I994,
bitterly divided leading parliamentary
People's Representatives and other
prodemocracy supporters. Futa Helu,
a prominent intellectual force behind
political reform, said that he thinks
Tonga is not ready for an independent
political party, and repeated the adage
that in Tonga the churches are the
political parties. On II August I994,
however, it was announced that five of
the elected People's Representatives,
'Akilisi Pohiva, 'Uiliami Fukofuka, and
'Uhila Liava'a, the first, second, and
third, respectively, of the People's
Representatives for Tongatapu, and
Teisina Fuko and 'Uliti Uata, the first
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and second People's Representatives
for Ha'apai, had organized the Tonga
Democratic Party in an effort to build
a "strong, united" political platform
for the reform movement and to
ensure that the People's Representa-
tives in the Legislative Assembly voted
in a bloc. Pohiva noted in an interview
that the kingdom's legal system has no
provision for the registration of politi-
cal parties. Nevertheless, a party con-
stitution that allows anyone to join
had been approved by party members.
The party's aim, Pohiva said, is to
bring about a more democratic govern-
ment, accountable to the people, who
would have a greater part in decision-
making. "We believe in and are pursu-
ing common goals," he said of the
founding members. "If there are indi-
vidual differences, we will compro-
mise" (TC, II Aug 1994, I).
Serious differences among the
founders soon surfaced, fired by the
change of name to the "People's Party"
by 20 August, when the constitution
was signed. Helu was particularly furi-
ous with the decision to leave out the
term Democratic, and orchestrated a
vigorous criticism of the parliamentari-
ans responsible in a number of letters
appearing under a variety of names in
local newspapers, particularly Taimi '0
Tonga. A great deal of his concern
appears to have revolved around his
not being consulted about the key deci-
sions. "It seemed that there was a lot
of secrecy associated with the forma-
tion process-for these five members
of parliament did not call a meeting of
supporters to consult with them on
their constitution or their plans," he
told Lali magazine. "They met by
themselves, approved their own consti-
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tution, voted themselves in to hold all
the positions of authority in the party,
then they announced that the people
can now become members.... this is
not democratic. It's downright dictato-
ria!!" (Lali, Oct 1994, 17). Pohiva
joined Helu in opposition to the
cofounders of the party in a move that
reflected earlier, long-standing, differ-
ences of opinion between them over
his more confrontational actions and
the means and goals of reform. Helu
has philosophical reasons and Pohiva
personal and political reasons for
pursuing avowedly democratic goals;
others in the reform movement are
less certain about them.
The fuss over the party's name does
not merely indicate conflict about a
formal movement toward democracy
in Tonga, although that conflict exists
among the party's leaders. It points
also to a very much underplayed but
fundamental split over Christian
beliefs, or the lack of them, held by
reformers and the role that religious
commitment should play in the life of
the newly formed party. Helu's values
and distinctive mode of critical enquiry
are based on qualities he associates
with an ancient Athenian elite, an
intellectual and ethical debt expressed
in the name 'Atenisi, given to the edu-
cational institution he founded. He
opposes all types of oppression of the
common people, which, he believes,
were imposed by traditional notions of
rank in Tonga and have continued in
the modern social and political order
largely through the support of the
order by the Christian churches. He
and many of his students and followers
are openly atheistic and agnostic.
Other people in the prodemocracy
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movement pursue the goals of social
justice and political reform because
they believe it to be their duty as
Christians. They would not welcome
reform won at the cost of religious
commitment. Their point of view was
expressed simply in a brief statement
released by the party in early Sep-
tember. "The People's Party ... seeks
to apply Christian principles to polit-
ical affairs as the only way of 'pro-
tecting the dignity of mankind'." It
reiterated its members' loyalty to the
monarch as the head of state, together
with the party's aim of "representing
the voice of the people" and seeking
the redistribution of political and eco-
nomic powers to allow citizens greater
participation in the institutions that
shape and control their lives. (TC, I
Sept 1994, 6). The chairman of the
People's Party, 'Uliti Data, hit back at
Helu's criticisms, saying discussion
about democracy had gone on for too
long in Tonga without a firm basis.
The strongest objection to the forma-
tion of a party had come from the
'Atenisi Institute, which "publicly
stated a few months ago that it was
definitely not the right time yet to set
up a democratic political party. It was
on this ground that they were not con-
sulted when the constitution was
drafted" (La/i, Oct 1994, 18).
Predictably, the establishment has
come to the party by questioning the
need for any reform because, it main-
tains, the government of Tonga has
been essentially democratic since the
1875 Constitution. Prime Minister
Baron Vaea of Houma claimed that,
despite revisions, the Tongan system of
government was originally based on
the British Westminster model to
which the People's Party aspires. He
nevertheless wished the People's Party
"good luck" and reminded people
once again of his own attempt in 199 2
to launch a Christian Democratic
Workers of Tonga Party to contest the
early 1993 general elections (La/i, Oct
1994, II). This was the first attempt in
Tonga to start a political party, but the
government bid for popular support
failed to win the approval it needed
from church leaders and was put aside.
Joining the confusion surrounding
democracy in Tonga was the comment
from a journalist, Erina Reddan,
broadcast over Radio Australia in
March 1995, that the king had told
her, in November 1994, that "democ-
racy is inevitable in Tonga." The king
immediately denied having made any
such improbable statement or having
said that "a fully elected government is
only a matter of time" (TC, 23 March
1995, I). The king later reiterated that
Tonga has no laws covering the opera-
tion of a political party and that there
was no recognized political party in
Tonga.
By June 1995, a beleaguered 'Uliti
Data was tending to agree with his
monarch. "The People's party is stand-
ing still because of dissatisfaction
among members," he said (MT, April-
June 1995, 5). The most serious split
within the party continues to be that
with its vice-president, Pohiva, who
continues his colorful litigious career,
although it is proving costly. In July
1994, he was served by the Tonga
Supreme Court with a garnishee order
that stopped his parliamentary salary
because of the T$IO,402 he still owes
Crown Prince Tupouto'a's lawyers
after the prince won a defamation case
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against him. To that point, in 1994,
Pohiva had paid T$ 56,000 in fines to
various people who had taken him to
court on defamation cases (MT, June-
July, 1994, 5). His behavior caused
Data, the chairman of the party, to call
him "unreliable" and refute Pohiva's
criticisms of the party that he had
helped found. In November 1994, on
the closing day of the Legislative
Assembly session, Pohiva was the
cause of further dissension when a
petition signed by four hundred
women was presented to the House
seeking action to be taken against him
because he had called the king a "dic-
tator" in an interview he had given to
a US newspaper. Pohiva apparently is
not honoring his parliamentary oath of
allegiance to the king when he goes
about telling reporters that the king is
a dictator. The unusual petition was
tabled by three of the executive mem-
bers of the newly formed party, but
then the members voted against one
another over whether or not the peti-
tion should be accepted. This outcome
seems to contradict one of the party's
goals that members should toe the
party line (MT, Oct-Dec 1994,41). In
addition, Pohiva threatened to sue 26
members of parliament for what he
claimed were unlawful overtime pay-
ments during the annual parliamentary
tour, 4 of the 26 in question being
executives of the new party. For pub-
lishing the criminally libelous claims in
the periodical Kele'a, of which he is
both editor and publisher, he was fined
a furtherT$600 on 29 May 1995.
Despite the several setbacks occa-
sioned by the opposition of first Futa
Helu and then Pohiva, the People's
Party members are continuing their
working program, explaining their
aims to church, village community, and
professional leaders (MT, Jan-Mar
1995,6).
Personalities continue to dominate
the political scene. Minister for
Finance Cecil Cocker was forced to
resign on 12 May 1995, after being
censured by New Zealand's Acting
Prime Minister Don McKinnon,
over allegations of misconduct at the
Asian Development Bank Confer-
ence in Auckland earlier that month.
Cocker was alleged to have sexually
harassed three women during the
meeting, including his official driver.
Cocker denied the allegations and
imputed the unfortunate interpreta-
tion of his behavior to "cultural
misunderstanding" (MT, April-June
1995,7)' Cocker was also reportedly
affected by alcohol when he delivered
his speech to the meeting, during
which he was asked several times by
the chair to stop when he repeatedly
attacked the Asian Development
Bank for denying Tonga a loan for
a hotel.
The Finance portfolio has been
taken by the Honourable Tutoatasi
Fakafanua, who is also acting minister
for Labour, Commerce and Industries
and acting minister for Tourism. The
minister made the news earlier in the
year when he was the target of a shoot-
ing incident. Two men, unhappy with
the government's refusal to approve
increases of 3000 tonnes to the pump-
kin squash export quota, set at 17,000
tonnes, fired guns outside his house in
November 1994 and damaged a van
belonging to him. On 6 December, the
Honourable Fakafanua formally par-
doned the men in a traditional cere-
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mony of forgiveness. The squash quota
was not altered.
The visible trade deficit for 1994 hit
T$72.7 million, an increase over the
1993 visible deficit of T$6r.8 million
that was attributable largely to the
poorer performance of squash on the
export market than in previous years.
Despite the loss in tariff revenue,
Tonga would be better off joining the
World Trade Organization, advised a
World Bank report, and the country
may soon do so. On the plus side, the
kingdom grew bigger with the emer-
gence of a new volcanic island 120
miles north of Nuku'alofa, on the
Metis Shoal. Notwithstanding the
67,000-square-meter increase to his
kingdom, the king, in his address at
the opening of the 95th Legislative
Assembly, in June 1995, again drew
attention to proposals to lease land in
Sarawak, and possibly also in Papua
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